EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report describes the Indian Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR), focusing on the reactor design and operational features that are relevant to proliferation risk, for both the AHWR intended for domestic use and the AHWR-LEU for export. The AHWR is the key component of the final stage of the three-stage Indian Nuclear program, "Thorium Utilization for Sustainable Power Programme," that has been in development since the 1950's. The nuclear program in India has historically assumed a heavy reliance on the ultimate transition to a thorium-based fuel cycle due to the abundant domestic thorium resources and the scarcity of domestic uranium. Both the AHWR and AHWR-LEU use thorium-based oxide fuels, with the AHWR using both UO 2 /ThO 2 and PuO 2 /ThO 2 fuels simultaneously, while AHWR-LEU uses only UO 2 /ThO 2 fuel. The AHWRs are essentially derivatives of the advanced CANDU reactor, with the fuel oriented vertically instead of horizontally and refueling still occurring on-line, but only from the top of the reactor. The export version, AHWR-LEU, operates with a once-through fuel cycle. In this case, only UO 2 /ThO 2 fuel with enriched uranium (19.75% 235 U) is used, and there is lower breeding of 233 U since, by design, the system is not self-sustaining. As a result, for uranium, FOM 1 is 1.0 in the fresh fuel and in the range of 0.63 to 0.94 in the spent fuel. There is no plutonium in the fresh fuel, and FOM 1 for the plutonium in the spent fuel ranges from 1.68 to 2.06. In this sense, the potentially weapons-usable materials in AHWR-LEU are similar to those available with a typical LWR.
From this initial review, positive nonproliferation attributes for the two reactors are difficult to identify clearly, at least in comparison to existing LWR technology. The AHWR produces very little plutonium since there is no 238 U in the fuel, and has a low percentage of 239 Pu remaining in the spent fuel from the initial plutonium loading. It effectively burns the plutonium in the PuO 2 /ThO 2 fuels used to drive the thorium to produce 233 U. At the same time, it is very important to recognize that this positive attribute with respect to plutonium comes along with the negative attributes of the highly attractive 233 U in the spent fuel, so that in effect, a trade has been made, and when all is considered, it appears that any benefit from the greatly reduced plutonium content is offset by the production of highly attractive uranium. However, the presence of 232 U may potentially complicate attempts at proliferation due to the emission of 2.6 MeV gamma radiation making the uranium difficult to shield and easy to detect.
The AHWR-LEU, as the name suggests, uses low enriched uranium fuel and produces plutonium from 238 U, just as in an LWR. The plutonium in the used fuel has 4 to 10% 238 Pu and 41 to 54% 239 Pu, similar in attractiveness to reactor grade plutonium from an LWR, but with a quantity that is about 10% lower than in a PWR.
It is also difficult to clearly identify specific negative nonproliferation aspects for these two reactors in comparison to existing LWR technology. Both the AHWR and AHWR-LEU use heavy water, a material of concern with regards to proliferation since use in reactors will allow production of weapons-grade plutonium from natural uranium. Given the high thermal crosssection of 232 Th, use of thorium in heavy-water moderated reactors will also be effective at producing 233 U. As with other reactors, it is possible to misuse the AHWR and AHWR-LEU for efficient 233 U or plutonium production.
The intent is to process spent AHWR fuel using a three-stream separation technique for the uranium, plutonium and thorium, which will create opportunities for diversion of nuclear material, as with any processing approach. Any country with the full system may also have gained technical knowledge and experience that would be useful for taking a plutonium or 233 U path to weapons production.
The fresh fuel of the AHWR-LEU contains 19.75% enriched 235 U (HEU is uranium enriched to greater than or equal to 20% 235 U), whereas the more commonly used LWR fuel is 3 to 5% enriched in 235 U. Because the export reactor will not have reprocessing and fuel fabrication facilities, both fresh and spent fuel shipments across international borders will frequently occur, which could pose physical protection risks for the AHWR-LEU fresh fuel since it may be an attractive theft target. Depending on where the uranium enrichment facilities are, any shipments of UF 6 to the fuel fabrication facility would also be attractive targets.
Additionally, the AHWR-LEU will produce plutonium, albeit in smaller quantities with lower 239 Pu content relative to a PWR. However, the isotopic composition of the plutonium is variable since burnup is easily adjustable in a reactor that is capable of on-line refueling, such as the AHWR-LEU. It is possible, although not ideal, to use the plutonium produced in the AHWR-LEU in a weapon, once again representing a proliferation risk in a variety of settings.
INTRODUCTION
India is developing the Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) as a key element of its Nuclear Programme as shown in Figure 1 , which assumes ultimate reliance on the 233 U-thorium fuel cycle. The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL) is responsible for design, construction, commissioning and operation of thermal nuclear power plants. They have stated that construction on the AHWR would start in 2014, with expected operation in 2019. As with the Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactor, the AHWR uses oxide fuel but uses a combination of UO 2 /ThO 2 and PuO 2 /ThO 2 fuel. The AHWR operates with a closed fuel cycle, intended for deployment in India. A similar concept, the Advanced Heavy Water Reactor -Low Enriched Uranium (AHWR-LEU), operates with UO 2 /ThO 2 using low-enriched uranium (LEU) enriched to 19.75% in 235 U, but the reactor operates on a once-through fuel cycle and is for export.
This report briefly describes the key features of the AHWR and AHWR-LEU with a focus on those aspects that relate to intrinsic proliferation risk, i.e., those aspects of the AHWR that are inherently part of the design and operation, such as quantities and isotopic distribution of special nuclear material (SNM), and fuel handling and storage, and does not address issues related to safeguards or safeguardability of the AHWR and its associated facilities. Section 3 and Appendix A provide an initial evaluation of such intrinsic proliferation-related attributes. Design-related information is from numerous sources, with References [1] and [2] being representative of the most recent comprehensive documents. It is important to note that the AHWR design appears to still be evolving, with the result that there are inconsistencies in the information among the various sources. As a consequence, the details and quantitative data discussed in this report are only "representative" at this stage and are subject to change. 
THE AHWR REACTOR
The AHWR reactor is similar to advanced CANDU reactor designs, with pressure tubes containing the reactor fuel and light water reactor coolant located inside of calandria tubes, surrounded by a low-pressure reactor vessel filled with heavy water that serves as both moderator and reflector, as shown in Figures 2, 3 , and 4. Air fills the annulus between each pressure tube and calandria tube to provide thermal insulation between the hot pressure tube and the cooler external heavy water moderator. Use of light water for the coolant follows the approach used for advanced CANDU designs, although most existing CANDU reactors utilize heavy water for the reactor coolant as well as for the moderator. However, the AHWR is a boiling water reactor and uses vertical pressure tubes instead of horizontal pressure tubes. As a result, the AHWR refuels only from the top of the reactor. In addition, each pressure tube in the AHWR contains only one long fuel "cluster," as compared to the multiple shorter fuel bundles in a typical CANDU reactor pressure tube. Coolant flow through the reactor core is provided via natural circulation driven by coolant boiling (there are no primary coolant pumps), and there is significant boiling in the core with an average steam quality of 18.2%. The reactor core also contains control rods for shut down, reactivity control, and spatial power distribution. Adopted for the AHWR Design Figure 5 shows the AHWR fuel element cluster which consists of 54 fuel pins arranged in three concentric rings around a central rod. Each fuel pin contains fuel pellets in Zircaloy-2 clad tubes (3500 mm in length). The fuel element cluster along with shielding is assembled into a "fuel assembly" so that each fuel assembly inserted in the reactor consists of three sections: the fuel element cluster and two shield sub-assembly sections, which are attached above the fuel cluster with collet joints, making the overall length of the fuel assembly 10.5 m. The use of a single fuel assembly in each pressure tube is necessary due to the vertical orientation of the pressure tubes in the reactor. (This is in stark contrast to the advanced CANDU design, where multiple (~12) short independent fuel bundles are contained within each horizontal pressure tube, facilitating refueling from either end of the CANDU reactor.) The fuel in the two inner rings of an AHWR fuel cluster contains UO 2 in ThO 2 where the UO 2 is mainly 233 U. The uranium percentage in the UO 2 /ThO 2 fuel is 3% UO 2 in ThO 2 in the inner ring and 3.75% UO 2 in ThO 2 in the middle ring. The outer ring contains PuO 2 in ThO 2 in two axial zones, 4.0% PuO 2 in the bottom (B) half of the cluster and 2.5% PuO 2 in the top (T) half of the cluster. No natural or enriched uranium is used. The radial and axial variation of fissile loading controls the power/critical heat flux ratio, a standard design parameter that is even more important in this design due to the use of natural circulation cooling of the reactor core at full power. Like the CANDU reactor, the AHWR refuels while the reactor is at power.
The AHWR-LEU fuel element cluster has the same construction as the AHWR, but the fuel composition is entirely different. All fuel is UO 2 in ThO 2, and all uranium is enriched to 19.75% 235 U (still LEU). The uranium percentage in the UO 2 /ThO 2 fuel is different in each of the three rings, with up to 18% UO 2 in ThO 2 in the inner ring, up to 22% UO 2 in ThO 2 in the middle ring, and up to 22.5% in the outer ring. Figure 5 and Table 1 
The AHWR Fuel Cycle
The AHWR operates in a closed fuel cycle with recycle of both 233 U and thorium back into the reactor. On-line refueling is the reference operating mode, with batch refueling during shutdown as an option. The currently envisaged [1] fuel cycle assumes that the fuel will reside in the reactor for a total of 4 years, followed by 2 years for cooling, 1 year for reprocessing and 1 year for re-fabrication into new fuel. The core design facilitates breeding 233 U from 232 Th and is selfsustaining in combination with the fast reactor of the second stage, i.e., overall creation of new fissile ( 233 U) combined with the makeup plutonium from spent PHWR fuel [1] equals the fissile consumed during the AHWR cycle. However, the initial core and reload fuel consists only of PuO 2 /ThO 2 until sufficient 233 U is available from the fast reactor of the second stage to provide the fuel pin loadings for the inner and middle rings as listed in Table 1 . Processing to extract and fabricate the 233 U-containing spent AHWR fuel is highly automated and remote and performed in a co-located facility, which will include reprocessing, waste management and fuel fabrication to minimize the time between separation and fuel fabrication since the 232 U content increases after separation, complicating operations and handling due to the high-energy gamma source.
Prior to reprocessing, fuel cluster disassembly segregates the two different fuel pin types: structural materials and any burnable absorbers. Different reprocessing methods for the two fuel pin types separate thorium, uranium and plutonium products. Fabrication of new UO 2 /ThO 2 fuel pins immediately uses approximately half of the reprocessed thorium. The remaining thorium is stored until its radioactivity has decreased sufficiently for handling with minimum shielding and stored until use for fabrication of PuO 2 /ThO 2 fuel pins. Overall, 60% of the power generated by the reactor comes from the 233 U created from thorium.
Characteristics of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM)
The AHWR spent fuel contains both plutonium and 233 U, while the AHWR-LEU spent fuel contains 233 U, all of which may be usable in nuclear weapons and may represent a proliferation concern. Table 2 contains initial and discharge uranium and plutonium masses (g/kg) and isotopic distributions from Reference [2] . Also included in Table 2 are preliminary calculations of FOM 1 and FOM 2 , with the derivation in Appendix A. The Indian project materials state that "The U contains sufficient quantity of 232 U and is proliferation resistant." Low FOMs indicate low material attractiveness and low weapons utility (i.e., difficult to be utilized in a weapon), usually indicated by FOM values less than one. The FOM 1 values for uranium in the AHWR are 2.69 and 2.55 at charge and discharge, respectively, which means that the amount of 232 U in the uranium is not sufficient to lower the material attractiveness of the 233 U below that of reactor grade plutonium. Thus, these analyses do not support the statement in the Indian project materials, and based on the FOM 1 values, the 233 U is possibly less "proliferation resistant" than reactor grade plutonium. However, for the AHWR-LEU, FOM 1 for uranium is 1.00 at charge and in the range of 0.63-0.94 at discharge due to the use of low enriched uranium which has a large percentage of 238 U. There are ranges of published data for spent fuel compositions in both of these reactors, as shown in Table 2 [2] . The results of independent calculations to verify the published results showed that the range of results is sufficiently representative. The calculations estimated the neutronics performance of an AHWR calandria tube, containing the fuel cluster and light water coolant, using DRAGON with ENDF/B-VII cross sections based on available published data and estimates for missing data on geometry and initial compositions required to complete the modeling. Table 3 summarizes the results for key parameters relevant to proliferation issues (uranium and plutonium loadings, material attractiveness, and isotopic composition) and the results are consistent with published data from various Indian presentations and publications, given the preliminary nature of the calculations and the lack of complete and consistent design data for AHWR. This result supports use of the data for the FOM 1 estimates of material attractiveness listed in Table 2 for AHWR and AHWR-LEU.
Efforts are currently underway to obtain a preliminary estimate of the dose from a fuel cluster at discharge. ORIGEN calculations provided spent fuel compositions, and the resulting 18-group gamma source will provide the input for dose calculations using MICROSHIELD assuming a homogeneous distributed volume source. 
Fuel Handling and Storage
As noted above, refueling of the AHWR can be either on-line during power operation or via batch mode when the reactor is shutdown, but the reactor only refuels from the top. The key elements of the fuel handling system and their functions are:
 The "Fueling Machine" (see Figure 6 ) for inserting and removing fuel assemblies moves on rails on the top of the reactor. The fueling machine operates remotely and consists of a ram assembly, magazine assembly, snout assembly, separator assembly and its trolley and carriage assembly. During refueling operations, the machine moves to the desired location over the reactor, makes a leak-tight connection with the selected coolant channel and performs all the required operations of removing seal plugs, extracting and disassembling the shield elements from the fuel cluster, and then performing the reverse operation with a fresh fuel cluster. A magazine assembly consists of eight tubes which temporarily store the various components throughout the process. The machine picks up fresh fuel from, and deposits spent fuel in, the "Temporary Fuel Storage Bay."
 The "Inclined Fuel Transfer Machine" (see Figure 7 ) moves fuel between the reactor building and the fuel building  The "Temporary Fuel Storage Bay" located inside the reactor building is the location where spent fuel discharged from the reactor is stored prior to transfer out of the reactor building, and fresh fuel is stored prior to insertion in the reactor.

The "Fuel Storage Bay" is located in the fuel building adjoining the reactor and stores fresh and spent fuel under water. The capacity assumes a refueling frequency of onefourth of the core per year, a 2-year cooling period for discharged fuel, and a 6-month inventory of fresh fuel. 
INITIAL OBSERVATIONS ON INTRINSIC DESIGN-RELATED NON-PROLIFERATION ATTRIBUTES
Some preliminary observations on the potential non-proliferation attributes of the AHWR and AHWR-LEU are as follows:
 Under nominal operating conditions, the spent fuel compositions are as given in Tables 2  and 3 , with FOM 1 values for material attractiveness as listed in Table 2 , showing that the 233 U in the AHWR is at least as attractive as reactor grade plutonium, while the uranium discharged from AHWR-LEU has attractiveness similar to LEU.

The AHWR fuel cluster is significantly larger and heavier than a CANDU fuel bundle. The fueling and re-fueling operations and the fuel transfers are much more complicated due to the remote assembly and disassembly of the shield sections to the fuel cluster, and the overall length of 10.5 m for the shields/fuel assembly.
The AHWR refueling interval is relatively infrequent, 113 fuel channels per year, or about 1 fuel cluster every three days, as compared to the typical handling averaging 6 much shorter CANDU fuel bundles per day. As a result, the AHWR refueling machine may be more readily available for refueling operations supporting short-time irradiations or other non-standard operations.
The capability to detect non-standard operation in support of safeguards implementation is unknown. It is noted that the low power generation per cluster may make it easier to irradiate non-standard materials since the disturbance to the core is low, likely increasing the potential for misuse.
 Spent fuel clusters would most likely be stored intact prior to further processing.
 At the time of processing spent AHWR fuel, disassembly of the fuel cluster separates the PuO 2 /ThO 2 fuel pins from the UO 2 /ThO 2 fuel pins for separate processing. The plutonium content in the spent PuO 2 /ThO 2 fuel is less than 0.7%, lower than the 1% or so that is typical of spent LWR fuel. However, the plutonium is also of low attractiveness, with less than 20% fissile content as listed in Table 3 . The quantity of plutonium in the spent UO 2 /ThO 2 fuel is insignificant, although it would be of higher attractiveness. However, the uranium recovered from processing UO 2 /ThO 2 fuel is highly attractive, as noted above.
For processing AHWR-LEU fuel, all of the fuel is enriched uranium so no segregation of the fuel pins is required. The plutonium is attractive based on FOM 1 , and the quantity is likely to be comparable to that in spent LWR fuel given the use of enriched uranium in AHWR-LEU which is greater than 80% 238 U. Any 233 U in the spent AHWR-LEU fuel is with large amounts of 238 U.
Possible Proliferation-Related Strengths
From this initial review, positive nonproliferation attributes for the two reactors are difficult to identify clearly, at least in comparison to existing LWR technology. The AHWR produces very little plutonium since there is no 238 U in the fuel and has a low percentage of 239 Pu remaining in the spent fuel from the initial plutonium loading. It effectively burns the plutonium in the PuO 2 /ThO 2 fuels used to drive the thorium to produce 233 U. At the same time, it is very important to recognize that this positive attribute with respect to plutonium comes along with the negative attributes of the highly attractive 233 U in the spent fuel, so that in effect, a trade has been made, and when all is considered, it appears that any benefit from the greatly reduced plutonium content is offset by the production of highly attractive uranium. However, the presence of 232 U may potentially complicate attempts at proliferation due to the emission of 2.6 MeV gamma radiation making the uranium difficult to shield and easy to detect.
The AHWR-LEU, as the name suggests, uses low-enriched uranium fuel and produces plutonium from 238 U, just as in an LWR. The plutonium in the used fuel has 4 to 10% 238 Pu and 41 to 54%
239 Pu, similar in attractiveness to reactor grade plutonium from an LWR, but with a quantity that is about 10% lower than in a PWR. Again, this is only a small change from existing LWR technology.
Possible Proliferation-Related Weaknesses
It is also difficult to clearly identify specific negative nonproliferation aspects for these two reactors in comparison to existing LWR technology. Both the AHWR and AHWR-LEU use heavy water, a material of concern with regards to proliferation since use in reactors will allow production of weapons-grade plutonium from natural uranium. Given the high thermal crosssection of 232 Th, use of thorium in heavy-water moderated reactors will also be effective at producing 233 U. Whether the use of heavy-water is a negative nonproliferation attribute is not clear. As with other reactors, it is possible to misuse the AHWR and AHWR-LEU for efficient 233 U or plutonium production.
The AHWR will use an average of 3.0-3.5 wt% plutonium in the fresh fuel, requiring approximately 500 kg of PuO 2 /ThO 2 fuel annually and the fresh fuel has a FOM 1 of 2.60. Hence, according to the IAEA definitions, the fresh fuel is "unirradiated direct-use material" with a 1-month detection timeliness period for the plutonium. Also, there are substantial quantities of potentially weapons-useable 233 U in the spent fuel. Although the developers of the AHWR claim the presence of 232 U as a sufficient deterrent, Tables 2 and 3 suggest that even the lowest grade 233 U from the AHWR is a fairly attractive material and will still be weapons-usable. The fresh fuel of the AHWR-LEU contains 19.75% enriched 235 U (HEU is uranium enriched to greater than or equal to 20% 235 U), whereas the more commonly used LWR fuel is 3 to 5% enriched in 235 U. Because the export reactor will not have reprocessing and fuel fabrication facilities, both fresh and spent fuel shipments across international borders will frequently occur. International transportation of 19.75% 235 U LEU may pose physical protection risks for the AHWR-LEU fresh fuel since it may be an attractive theft target. Depending on where the uranium enrichment facilities are, any shipments of UF 6 to the fuel fabrication facility would also be attractive targets.
Additionally, the AHWR-LEU will produce plutonium, albeit in smaller quantities with lower 239 Pu content relative to a PWR. However, the isotopic composition of the plutonium is variable since burnup is easily adjustable in a reactor that is capable of on-line refueling, such as the AHWR-LEU. It is possible, although not ideal, to use the plutonium produced in the AHWR-LEU in a weapon, once again representing a proliferation risk in a variety of settings as seen in the FOM tabulations in Table 2 .
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